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Abstract: Public works procurement regulates two award procedures from within the same criteria: either the price or a 
variety of different conditions. Although the question of price may not seem the most important factor to be considered, it is 
imperative to always be aware of it when bearing in mind the award criteria. Economic scoring formulae (ESF) are numerous 
and each agency has the authority to determine which will be used for each of their bids, making this article a comparative 
analysis of all the options. The results show that most formulas give the highest score to the most economic bidder, it is 
necessary to eliminate the use of formulas that give the highest score to the offers which are closest to the average of all bids 
submitted. One should always opt for formulas with moderate or strong scoring gradients across various stages or phases, 
thereby giving more weight to economic analysis, as set out in the various administrative clauses. 
Keywords: Procurement, Economic Scoring Formulae, Construction, Project Management, Bids 
 
1. Introduction 
Auctions or the most competitive pricing were the first 
and clearest characteristics of modern award procedures. 
The increasing complexity of projects and on the odd occa-
sion extremely low awarded bids threatened the contractual 
performance and the financial state of the contractor. This 
was why a lot of research was carried out focussing on de-
termining or establishing optimal price by developing pre-
diction models and bidding strategies [1-4], paying less 
attention to the analysis of other award criteria [5-9]. 
On the one hand, current hiring research is based around 
determining the correct selection criteria and the develop-
ment of contractor selection models using a multi-criteria 
analysis of neural network techniques [10-12] in technical 
AHP-ANP [13] or DEA techniques [14-15]. Another avenue 
of research is the development of mathematical models that 
help to make the decision of whether to compete for a con-
tract. And if so, determining the optimum value based on 
certain criteria and risks for tenderers [16-19]. The latter 
group may include the development of prediction models 
based lower rates taking into account historical economic 
openings of a particular public body [20-21]. 
Many of these investigations are presented from the point 
of view of the tenderers, disregarding the fact that legislation 
does not evolve as fast as the tender in the private sector, and 
that each government, national, regional and local agency 
has their individual preferences or arbitrary natures when it 
comes to the selection the award criteria for public contracts. 
Although this paper only contains Spanish tenders doc-
uments, the ESF and the variables analyzed are directly 
applicable to any country where requesting administrations 
or contracting authorities set an initial tender price against 
which candidates must underbid (capped tendering or up-
per-limited priced tendering). 
The European Directive 2004/18/EC [22] and in Spain’s 
case, The Royal Decree 3/2011 [23] that approves the Res-
tated Text of the Law on Public Sector Contracts (here in 
after RTLPSC), govern public procurement. Each public 
body shall determine the relevant contract documents and 
the specific characteristics of the work to tender, highlight-
ing among other things the award criteria. The award criteria 
should be tailored to the technical capabilities of the con-
tracting authority and shall be related to issues directly 
linked to the subject of the contract, i.e. defining or charac-
terizing the project out to tender. These must not to be con-
fused with bidder-suitability criteria [24-26], which can 
justify the technical and economic soundness of the tender-
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ers. 
The legislation examines two award procedures; the first 
of which is used when there is only award criterion: the price, 
and the second procedure is applied when using multiple 
award criteria in which, although not officially specified, the 
price will be a factor (Report 28/95 of Advisory Board on 
State Administrative Contracting, ABSAC [27]). The con-
tract documents shall state the importance of each of the 
evaluation criterion along with the individual methods and 
scoring formulae. 
If various forms of valuation are used, they are split 
among measureable criteria by applying different formulae 
and conditions to make a value judgment. The first will be 
allocated predetermined formulae and the score will be 
calculated by applying the appropriate one, these will in-
clude aspects such as price, completion time, etc., mean-
while, the scores resulting from the measurable criteria and 
the value judgement will always be subject to a degree of 
independent bias because they depend on technician or 
technicians who perform the assessment. 
The European and Spanish regulatory system stipulate 
that scores resulting from the valuation decision made upon 
measurable criteria are to be established before the opening 
of the evaluated criteria based on a formula as a way to avoid 
any possibility of fraud. Both best practice guidelines and 
legislation state that the weight of the evaluated criteria 
based on a formula is greater than the weight of the valuation 
decision made upon measurable criteria (at least in open or 
restricted procedures). However, if this weren’t the case, the 
rules laid out in Article 150.2 (RTLPSC) examine the eval-
uation of these criteria by bringing on technicians with no 
personal interest or otherwise in the organisation that has 
promoted the contract. 
Competitive bidding in the Spanish construction sector 
has been, is and will be one of its fundamental pillars, the 
main core of the work of many Spanish construction com-
panies whether they be local, regional, national or interna-
tional. In 2006 public bidding reached a record high at 
44,205,305,000 euros, maintaining lower yet not so distinct 
values in successive years (2007 to 37,399,432,000 euros, 
2008 to 38,495,264,000 euros and 2009 to 35,354,070,000 
euros) when the public sector had to invest vast capital in 
order to offset the collapse of the private construction sector; 
particularly in the residential construction subsector. The 
current economic situation means that European govern-
ments and especially the Spanish government have had to 
limit state borrowing and drastically reduce the amount of 
public investment in new infrastructure. In total, 11,781,358 
euros in 2011, a number not dissimilar to values from the 90s, 
but despite all that, tender reference in the Spanish con-
struction sector is undeniable. 
 
Figure 1. Public Bidding of Spanish Government. Building and Civil Engineering. Source: Data from Ministry of Development. Spanish Government.
Despite the great importance of public procurement in the 
construction sector and the economic volume involved, 
there are no specific regulations or guidelines about the 
scoring formulae behind the economic criteria [28]. It seems 
that with tenders based wholly on price, the most economi-
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nomic formula is not so strong. However for tenders with 
several criteria to be considered, the best bid will be the one 
which obtains the highest overall score in all the criteria 
measured. As such, mid-range scores based on price become 
particularly significant. 
This data will be used to determine what are the criteria or 
scoring formulae used today, and to analyse their perfor-
mance in order to establish less arbitrary selection guidelines 
on behalf of the contracting authorities. 
2. Material and Methods 
2.1. Data collection 
The starting point for the analysis of the criteria or scoring 
formulae behind economic criteria was to obtain data from a 
sample of one hundred works projects, bid on by the public 
sector, which reflect different characteristics of the sector: 
local, provincial, regional and national Civil Works and 
Building subsectors, several award allocation criteria where 
price had a certain importance, etc. The data required for 
drawing up the study sample were the administrative terms 
and techniques, the invitation to tender and project execution, 
the budget and the annex of the justification of indirect costs. 
Despite the principle of equality and transparency in 
which the legislation enacts in its provisions, and the crea-
tion of "Contractor Profile" in each and every website be-
longing to the contracting authorities, data collection has 
been an arduous task. Due in part to the administrations 
having many construction projects in copy shops or because 
of their distribution being carried out upon on payment of a 
fee. From this process comes the first of many observations: 
why doesn’t the government use twenty-first century media 
resources to allow free access to documentation? 
For each of the works studied and after analysis of the 
documentation a table was drawn up (Figure 2) with the 
following fields; the first block corresponds to the Con-
tracting Authority Data (name, unit, URL of Contractor 
profile and geographic scope), a second block which reflects 
the Contract Data (type, description, batch, file number, date 
of issue and date of tender) and a third block, called 
Processing and Procedure which reflect data on the type of 
procedure, the type of processing, how to award the tender, 
the bidding budget, annuity, the formula (if available) and 
price revision and the required contractor’s classification. 
 
Figure 2. Table for the study of the Contract Documents of the Public Procurements. 
In this third block of information, fields for the descrip-
tion of the award criteria are also reflected with a special 
focus on a more detailed economic scoring formula (price) 
and formulas or guidelines for determining whether there are 
abnormal or disproportionate deals. 
Finally, a fourth block called Project Data reflects data on 
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Budget Execution Material (BEM), on its disintegration 
through labour, materials, equipment and indirect costs, as 
well as data execution time and estimated labour timescales 
(if available). Justification is ultimately reflected in the 
percentage of indirect costs used in developing the project 
budget. 
The data collected is vast and varied and can characterise 
the sample from different points of view. The most relevant 
aspects are reflected in the following graphs (Figures 3-6). 
The sample presented mainly projects with ordinary 
processes, open procedure and a competition based award 
allocation. This represents almost 50% of the Building and 
Civil Works subsector and the different economic strata and 
geographical reach as indicated above. 
 
Figure 3. Tendering by Geographical Scope from Works Projects studied. 
 
Figure 4. Tendering by Subsector from Works Projects studied. 
 
Figure 5. Tendering by Tender Price from Works Projects studied. 
 
Figure 6. Tendering by Auction Form from Works Projects studied. 
2.2. Analysis 
A first analysis of the sample with respect to the economic 
criteria, as seen in Figure 7, reflects the economic weight of 
the total economic criteria of the tender is apparent in 40% 
of cases; between 41 and 50 points based on total of 100 
points. Another point to note is that the use of price as the 
sole criterion for the award allocation (auction) is practically 
residual (7%) with respect to the award allocation through 
several criteria (competition). 
In the study sample, many scoring criteria or economic 
formulae have been pinpointed and grouped according to 
their characteristics into ten groups which are described 
below. This indicates the criteria that have subsequently 
been used in the mathematical analysis. 
Before we must define the concept of “Bidder´s Drop”. It 
is the discount or bid reduction on the tender price of a 
contract (Pt) submitted by a given contractor i for a particular 
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D                   (1) 
Where: 
Di is the Drop of bidder i (expressed in %) 
Bi is the Bid (expressed in monetary values) 
Pt is the Tender price (expressed in monetary values) 
Group I. In this group there are two criteria. For both, the 
highest score is awarded to the lowest bidder, while the first 
one (Ia) with zero points to supply the type of competition 
(Pt) is valued. In the second of the criteria (Ib) zero points are 
allocated to the highest bidder resulting in a linear interpo-
lation between the two values for the remaining interme-
diary deals. 
Group II. The maximum score is awarded to the lowest 
bidder. The score is reached for the following deals in a 
linear manner over several steps. These steps are predefined 
by fixed amounts or the average of the bids submitted is used. 
They differ in the two criteria analyses. 
The first one (IIa) uses a polygonal function divided into 
three sections, the first taken from the offer rate and the 
Mean Drop (Dm), making the Dm 87.5% of the score. This is 
followed by a second step in which the upper limit is found 
in the Mean Drop plus five percentage points (Dm +5) with a 
maximum score of 95%. Finally, a last step in which the 
value will match the maximum drop, which in any case shall 
not exceed the mean drop plus ten percentage points (define 
the criterion of disproportionality of the offers in the scoring 
formula itself). 
The second polygonal function of this group of criteria 
(IIb) has two steps using, as an inflection point, the arith-
metic average of the percentages of the Mean Drop (Dm). 
The formulas expressing the score for each interval are: 
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Figure 7. Economic Weight regard Total Weight of the Tender (Total = 100 points).
and for the lower step using the next formula: 
[ ]2)(85 ⋅−−= imi DDS                (3) 
Where: 
Si is the scoring of the bidder i (expressed in points) 
Di is the Drop of bidder i (expressed in %) 
Dm is the Mean Drop (expressed in %) 
Dmax is the Maximum Drop (expressed in %) 
Group III. The maximum score is awarded to the most 
economical bid without explicitly indicating the scores for 
the rest of the offers in the contract documents. 
Group IV. This section is used to reflect different scoring 
criteria that are dissimilar to other selection criteria. Four 







































i         (5) 
n⋅=σδ                    (6)  
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Where: 
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Bm is the Mean Bid (expressed in monetary value) 
Bmin is the Lowest Bid (expressed in monetary value) 
n is the Number of bidders 
Pt is the Tender price (expressed in monetary values) 
Wp is the Maximum weight of the criterion price (ex-
pressed in points) 
δ is a parameter calculated by the expression (6) 













































S            (9) 
Group V. The maximum score is given to offers close to 
the average of the bids submitted. Other offers (and their low 
averages) which vary from that average (both above and 
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Group VI. All companies obtain a minimum score for 
their financial proposals and the rest of the score, right up to 
the maximum awarded to the lowest bid, is interpolated 
linearly or is given a proportional score across several steps. 
Two criteria have been analyzed within this group. The 
first one (VIa) has a low value of 15.9% which is represented 
as the turning point. 
If the maximum drop is less than or equal to 15.9% the 
score shall be obtained by linear interpolation between 30 
points for a drop of 0% and one hundred points for the 
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When the maximum drop is bigger than 15.9%, the offers 
will be pointed from a drop of 0% until a bid of 15.9%, 
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S ii             (14) 
The second criterion of this group (VIb) gives a minimum 
score of ten points to each bidder, and the rest of points 
through a expression with a only step depending of the 











⋅−=             (15) 
Group VII. The maximum score is awarded to the lowest 
bid, giving the other companies a score which is proportio-
nate to the offer. There are two criteria, the formula VIIa that 
works with the bids, and the criterion VIIb that the formula 
which works with the drops. 
Group VIII. A number of points will be awarded for each 
drop as a percentage of the bid price; the maximum score is 
usually limited. This group analysed two criteria: VIIIa 
grants a maximum of ten points for each five lower per-
centage points, and VIIIb criterion gives the highest score to 
the lowest bidder and the rest will have one point subtracted 
for each 0.5% (or the appropriate proportion) of a price 
increase on the lowest bid. 
Group IX. The maximum score goes to the lowest bid, 
calculating the score for all remaining bids using the fol-
lowing formula: 
Criterion IX. 











K                  (17) 
Where: 
K is a parameter calculated by the expression (17) 
ε is the quotient between the Bidder´s i Drop (Di) and the 
Maximum Drop (Dmax), expressed both in %. 
Group X. The maximum score goes to the lowest bid, 
obtaining the appropriate score of other companies but tak-
ing into account the difference with regard to the minimum 
bid or the average bid from bidding companies. The scoring 
formula has been analysed, where a priori the maximum 
score of the criterion for deals of less than the arithmetic 
average of the bids submitted, will be dictated by the limi-
















S             (18) 
Fig. 8 shows the distribution according to the groups de-
scribed, the formulas or scoring criteria of procurement 
specifications from the study sample, where group VII’s 
criteria is shown as the most widely used with 38%, in other 
words, the highest score is awarded to the lowest or cheapest 
bid. The other companies receive a proportional score ac-
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cording to the offer or the lowest rate incurred. Subsequently, 
closely-related values which differ greatly from the criteria 
of Group VII are from the group VI criteria with 11%, the 
criteria which form groups II and III with 10% and the cri-
teria set X with 9% respectively. 
 
Figure 8. Formulas or Scoring Criteria. 
2.3. Applying Data from Projects 
Having identified the main scoring criteria, it is necessary 
to study their behaviour by applying data from the economic 
opening of two projects; one, a project from the Building 
subsector with few bidders, and the other from the Civil 
Engineering subsector with many bidders. The project from 
the Building subsector is the construction of the SUNP VI 
Sports Centre by the Council of Sagunto, file 59/90, with a 
budget of EUR 2,786,034.48 tender + VAT. Whereas the 
project from the Civil Engineering subsector is for the re-
paving of the streets within the Huerta Nueva area and The 
Sax Avenue in Elda (Alicante); tendered by the Department 
of Infrastructure and Transport of the Generalitat Valenciana, 
file: 2010/09/0103, with a budget of EUR 1,366,444.98 
tender + VAT. 
In this case and in order to standardise the comparison 
between the various criteria or formulas, all maximum bids 
will score 50 points, and the scoring of the remaining bids 
will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of each 
criterion. 
Table 1. Economic Opening Results for SUNP VI Sports Centre by the 
Council of Sagunto. 
Tendering Company Bid (Euros) Drop (%) 
Via Latina S.A. A 2,667,273.43 € 4.26 
Elecnor B 2,758,174.14 € 1.00 
Secopsa  
Construcciones S.A. 
C 2,769,742.11 € 0.58 
Valcomar S.A. D 2,307,981.50 € 17.16 
Intersa Levante S.A. E 2,368,129.31 € 15.00 
 
Table 2. Economic Opening Results for the repaving of the streets within the Huerta Nueva area and the Sax Avenue in Elda (Alicante). 
Tendering Company Bid (Euros) Drop (%) 
Electricidad Paquete-Mainco B1 1,355,932.21 0.77 
Gestaser-Secopsa B2 1,332,016.26 2.52 
Rover Alcisa B3 1,328,000.00 2.81 
Mac-Puar  
Servicios Industriales 
B4 1,325,451.63 3.00 
Asfaltos Guerola-Symetra B5 1,318,619.41 3.50 
Assignia, S.A.-Ing. 
Del Agua Y La Energia 
B6 1,309,054.29 4.20 
Vaseco-Villegas B7 1,298,669.31 4.96 
Saico B8 1,298,122.72 5.00 
Beneaguas-Electrisur B9 1,288,782.94 5.68 
Construcciones  
Proyme Alginet 
B10 1,284,458.28 6.00 
Edificaciones Castelló-Urbamed B11 1,283,775.06 6.05 
S.A. De Riegos  
Camios Y Obras 
B12 1,277,659.35 6.50 
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Tendering Company Bid (Euros) Drop (%)  
Ezentis Infraestructuras B14 1,256,856.09 8.02 
Pavasal B15 1,250,559.46 8.48 
Grupo Generala-Reticulares B16 1,249,067.36 8.59 
Construcciones Frances B17 1,249,019.00 8.59 
Cyes Infraestructuras B18 1,246,197.82 8.80 
Bm3 Obras Y  
Servi-Riegos Vinalopó 
B19 1,241,688.55 9.13 
Torrescamara B20 1,232,533.37 9.80 
Coinger B21 1,229,800.48 10.00 
Grupo Bertolín-Procumasa B22 1,225,154.57 10.34 
Ecisa B23 1,225,000.00 10.35 
Ocide B24 1,222,421.68 10.54 
Binaria B25 1,213,403.14 11.20 
Becsa B26 1,207,720.72 11.62 
Jotsa-Geosa B27 1,206,530.97 11.70 
Serrano Aznar  
Obras Publicas 
B28 1,201,378.00 12.08 
Dopema-Esclapes  
E Hijos 
B29 1,189,490.36 12.95 
Enrique Ortiz E Hijos B30 1,183,103.45 13.42 
Arcion B31 1,172,683.08 14.18 
Adesval-Electotecnica Morales B32 1,168,310.46 14.50 
Chm Obras  
E Infraestructuras 
B33 1,159,291.92 15.16 
Intersa Levante B34 1,116,802.00 18.27 
    
3. Results and Discussion 
The graphical representation of the scores of the different 
economic criteria, from lowest to highest, provides us with a 
curve that we can call [25] Scoring Gradient. This curve 
shows the highest and the lowest scoring losses that occur 
when a bidder walks away from the lowest rates or the best 
scores. 
The slope of the score curve is one factor that bidders take 
into account when deciding on their final offer. Steep curves 
create the need to bid more boldly for a greater score in order 
to distance oneself from ones competitors, however gentle 
slopes in the curve can generate less risky deals that may be 
offset in the valuation of other aspects (technical procedure, 
environmental measures, quality control guarantees, etc.). 
This aspect can be seen (Tables 3 and 4) for the criteria VIb, 
VIIa and X where the difference between the score of the 
minimum bid and maximum bid varies between eight and 
ten points in both tenders, regardless of the number of bid-
ders and the standard deviation of the bids. 
The Scoring Gradient for the different formulas originates 
from various points, for the criterion Ib, it is performed at 
zero and the highest bid wins. For other criteria, the start of 
the curve depends on the distance between the highest bid 
and the tender price or the average of the bids submitted. 
What is remarkable is that the criteria located within the 
group VI where bidders are assures a minimum score (30 out 
of 100 on the criterion VIa)
1
 to which, according to the 
relevant formula, points will be added corresponding to the 
drop set out by the bidder. This minimum score confirms the 
gentle slope of the VIb criterion and influences the cases 
where the lowest maximum falls below the drop (15.9%) as 
indicated in the criterion VIa. 
Regarding the final point of the curve, it is also advisable 
to make an assessment following the guidelines and direc-
tives of the interpretations of the current legislation. Ac-
cording to which, the lowest bid should receive the highest 
score from the economic criteria, but this is not so with all 
ESF (criteria IVb, IVd, V and X). For the first three criteria, 
each one introduces the reference to tender price and the 
average of the offers into the formulae either directly or 
through parameters which depend on the standard deviation 
of the bids. This means intermediate slopes of the score 
curves which are more or less pronounced depending on the 
                                                             
1
 With the standardization of the score to 50 points, and in order to carry out the 
comparison of this article, a minimum score of 15 points will be awarded. 
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number of bidders and the offers available. For example, the 
IVb criterion yields a score difference of 11.17 for the work 
of the civil works subsector in contrast with 34.33 from the 
building subsector work. 
Table 3. Table-Summary by applying the ESF to the data from the economic opening results of the Project from the Building Subsector. 
Criteria Maximum Score Minimum Score Score Difference Economic Difference 
Ia 50.00 1.70 48.30 461,760.61 
Ib 50.00 0.00 50.00 461,760.61 
IIa 50.00 3.37 46.63 461,760.61 
IIb 50.00 33.19 16.81 461,760.61 
III 50.00 -- -- -- 
IVa 50.00 1.72 48.28 461,760.61 
IVb 42.77 8.44 34.33 461,760.61 
IVc 50.00 5.00 45.00 461,760.61 
IVd 28.60 0.97 27.62 461,760.61 
V 32.43 13.08 19.35 102,468.68 
VIa 50.00 16.10 33.90 461,760.61 
VIb 50.00 41.33 8.67 461,760.61 
VIIa 50.00 41.66 8.34 461,760.61 
VIIb 50.00 1.70 48.30 461,760.61 
VIIIa 50.00 12.50 37.50 461,760.61 
VIIIb 50.00 9.99 40.01 461,760.61 
IX 50.00 3.35 46.65 461,760.61 
X 30.17 21.20 8.97 461,760.61 
Table 4. Table-Summary by applying the ESF to the data from the economic opening results of the Project from the Civil Engineering Subsector. 
Criteria Maximum Score Minimum Score Score Difference Economic Difference 
Ia 50.00 2.11 47.89 239,130.21 
Ib 50.00 0.00 50.00 239,130.21 
IIa 50.00 3.86 46.14 239,130.21 
IIb 50.00 26.59 23.41 239,130.21 
III 50.00 -- -- -- 
IVa 50.00 2.13 47.87 239,130.21 
IVb 30.83 19.66 11.17 239,130.21 
IVc 50.00 6.91 43.09 239,130.21 
IVd 38.50 1.62 36.88 239,130.21 
V 49.66 13.53 15.58 109,734.39 
VIa 50.00 16.45 33.55 239,130.21 
VIb 50.00 41.29 8.71 239,130.21 
VIIa 50.00 41.18 8.82 239,130.21 
VIIb 50.00 2.11 47.89 239,130.21 
VIIIa 50.00 19.23 30.77 239,130.21 
VIIIb 50.00 7.18 42.82 239,130.21 
IX 50.00 4.12 45.88 239,130.21 
X 30.23 20.64 9.59 239,130.21 
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Another notable aspect of the results shown in Figures 9 
and 10 is the criterion V, where the maximum score is not 
obtained by the company which made the best financial offer 
but by the company whose offer was the closest to the av-
erage of all bids submitted. This fact actually contradicts the 
principles of the European and Spanish legislations, which 
were explicitly set out by the European Commission [29] in 
and by the ABSAC [30]. As shown in Figure 8 in the sample 
studied used this approach or something very similar in 4% 
of the bids. 
 
Figure 9. Applying Scoring Criteria to data from the economic results of the Project of Building Subsector. 
The VIIIa criterion, which gives the score based on drops, 
allows many bidders to achieve the highest score once they 
have passed the threshold. If this is very low the same thing 
can happen as with the economic results of the civil works 
subsector in which of the thirty-four bidders, all except for 
one get the highest score, completely negating the weight of 
the economic criterion. 
It is also important to note the VIIa criterion, a criterion in 
which the score obtained is in proportion to the tender price 
and works with the financial bids in euros. Score loss 
amongst the less risky deals with regards to on the most 
economically advantageous offer is not as high when 
working with economic value (bids) as the drops. 
Finally, the criterion IIb, whose high score for the highest 
bid and whose moderate gradient score (16.81 and 23.41 
points difference between the building works and the civil 
engineering subsectors respectively) is due to the scoring 
formula for companies whose bids fall below the mean offer, 
minimized their points losses by implementing a coefficient 
(equal to 2) at the lower end of the scoring formula scale 
(IIb.2 criterion). 
 












































































































































































The first point to be noted as a result of analysis of the 
scoring formulas behind economic criteria is the amount and 
disparity of the formulas. This means that the government 
must regulate common rules or formulae for all procedures, 
or at least establish some guidelines depending on the type 
of work, the number of bidders or the amount of money 
involved. 
The next issue would be to eliminate the use of formulae 
that give the highest score to companies whose bid is nearest 
to the average of all bids submitted (group V). This is be-
cause it undermines the concept of the optimum bid and 
because it determines policy directives. Other scoring for-
mulae which need to be reformed or even eliminate dare 
included in group VIII. As the score awarded is based on a 
drop of the tender price, limiting the maximum score to a 
certain percentage will there by allowing the government to 
fix the price at the amount necessary to carry out the work 
avoiding any highest drop compensation in scoring. There-
fore, the importance of price in the award allocation process 
disappears. 
Choosing the optimal formula of all options studied is a 
complex issue and could interfere with the contracting au-
thorities’ free reign which has been granted by the regula-
tions. However, if guidelines we established, they should 
relate to the most suitable of criteria. The main objective 
would be to achieve proportionality between offers (or drops) 
and the scores received. It seems clear that the lowest bid 
should get the highest score and that guaranteed minimum 
score should exist. This would allow for the Scoring Gra-
dient to start at zero points (if that score is awarded to the 
highest bid) or from the difference between the drop and the 
tender price up to the highest score of the economic criteria. 
The slope of the score curve is what the contracting au-
thorities should carefully define in order to find formulae 
with moderate or strong scoring gradients across various 
stages or phases, thereby giving more weight to economic 
criteria in the award allocation process as set out in the 
various administrative clauses. When selecting these mod-
erate or strong scoring gradients, another possibility is to 
stagger them across various phases, with higher slopes in the 
initial stages to achieve minimum bids every time, and then 
scoring groups with less intense gradients which would also 
result in awarding bolder tenderers with higher scores. 
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